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Abstract
Democracy is not just about the choice of policy determined by the aggregation of 
ballots cast in elections. It is also about managing tensions which may arise between 
proclaimed virtues of democratic values and the vicissitudes of public opinion. Fur-
ther, a conundrum arises because it is not for the electorate to spend time and energy 
acquiring specialist knowledge about the efficacy of action, but the voters expect to 
be consulted on policy. It is a lofty ideal of democracy that the electorate can hold 
government responsible for adverse outcomes not expected by the voters when cast-
ing their ballots on policy. Resort to referendums does not necessarily resolve these 
contradictory demands of democracy, but it can amplify them.
Keywords Participatory democracy · Election · Referendum · Dangers to democracy
JEL Codes D02 · D70 · H10 · H19
1 Introduction
Democracy is a contested idea, but there is a consensus which can form a basis 
for discussion (Frey 2017, p. 3): “A basic idea of democracy is that people being 
affected by political decisions have a say.” Survey reports suggesting that support 
for democracy has declined in Europe following the financial meltdown in 2007 are 
concerning (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014, Table 2, p. 432). Concern has been 
expressed in Britain about low rates of participation, especially of the young, in 
elections: “We believe that improving voter engagement is crucial to the long term 
Section III in the text draws closely on arguments I have made earlier in this journal (Chakravarty 
2008), as noted in Footnote 3.
Appendix B draws closely on arguments which appear in a blog on Brexit which I had written 
following the Brexit referendum.
 * Shanti P. Chakravarty 
 s.p.chakravarty@bangor.ac.uk
1 Business School, Bangor University, Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2DG, UK
236 Homo Oeconomicus (2018) 35:235–254
1 3
well-being of democracy in the UK” (House of Commons 2014, p. 3). Some of 
these discussions lead to a recommendation for direct participation by the electorate 
in policy making. Our contention is that recommendations for resort to referendums 
to improve public engagement with the democratic process are misleading.
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution in its  12th Report 
invited submissions from constitutional scholars some of whom recommended resort 
to referendums to increase public engagement with the political system (House of 
Lords 2010, p. 13). Bruno Frey extols the virtue of the Swiss system of participa-
tory democracy (Frey 2017, 1994). Citing happiness indices, he claims that voters 
in Switzerland feel engaged with decisions which affect them by being able to vote 
in local referendums. Pursuing this line of analysis, he calls this the public choice 
approach, Frey has prescriptions about improving the quality of the democratic 
process, for example by extending the right to franchise to non-citizens who have 
made a home in the country. The main thrust of his recommendations is the Swiss 
Style voter engagement through referendums. We suggest that something important 
is missing in this line of enquiry based on the rational choice approach using the 
tools of utilitarian economics. There is no examination of the information content of 
choice sets and there is no discussion of values that provide moral legitimacy to the 
choice that is made. This is a point raised in the seminal work by Arrow (1963) on 
individual choice and social values, but it is a point which is mostly neglected in the 
public choice literature.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the poverty of the exclusive 
focus on elections in the economic approach to the analysis of democracy. Section 3 
discusses the background of economic change leading to changes in political institu-
tions. Section 4 considers the dangers to democracy of majority rule. Section 5 high-
lights the tension between the rule of law and vicissitudes of public opinion as it 
impacts on individual liberty. Section  6 points to the challenge for democracy in 
truncating the choice set to address the above problem and to obtain consensus. Sec-
tion 7 highlights a concern about the length of the period of remit of referendums. 
One of the purposes of changing government through the ballot box in a democracy 
is to cater for the potential disconnect between ex ante choice of policy and ex post 
judgement by the electorate of the desirability of the outcome of that choice. Refer-
endums, especially when they are perceived as popular mandates which run beyond 
normal electoral cycles, fail to meet that purpose which is essential to democracy. 
Section 8 continues with that theme to argue that resort to referendums is a confes-
sion of failure in a democracy. Section 9 concludes.
2  Political Expectations of Democracy
There are various manifestations of the idea of democracy as people “having a say” 
(Frey 2017, p. 3) in how they are governed. For example, democracy might be con-
strued as a particular “type of a social structure and as a set of political expectations” 
(Mills 1977, p. 130). In the public choice literature in politics, these expectations are 
examined using the tools of utilitarian neo-classical economics. The assumption is 
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that individuals maximize their preferences over policies in voting decisions.1 One 
line of enquiry in this tradition has been the search for the properties of voting rules 
because “difficulties in aggregating preferences [of voters] arise in the case of a pop-
ulation with a lack of a consensus…[and] the choice of electoral system can make 
the greatest difference…where apparently minor differences can directly influence 
the outcome” (Levin and Nalebuff 1995, p. 4).2
To make matters more difficult, voters themselves aggregate over policies, but 
polling data suggests that their choice of parties is not always commensurate with 
their views on a range of policies. For example, a majority of those that identified 
with Labour supported the Conservative policy of reduction in the higher rate of 
income tax in the 1979 general election (Leonard and Mortimore 2001, Table 13.3.3, 
p. 180). A major study of the British electorate found that the support base for both 
Labour and Conservative parties was becoming less committed to their respective 
party’s policies (Särlvik and Crewe 1983). Disconnect between support for a presi-
dential candidate and a wide range of policy issues has also been reported in the 
United States (Chomsky 2006, p. 215). The choice made by the voter begins to lose 
clarity. These difficulties of aggregation provide temptations to galvanize political 
participation through single issue referendums. However, the quality of democracy 
is not enhanced by increasing enthusiasm to make the effort to turn up at the polling 
booth by putting complex and contentious issues for adjudication by the electorate 
in referendums.
The ideals of democracy, for example enabling the flourishing of ideas through 
tolerance of diversity and rational discourse over differences, which confer legiti-
macy on democratic decisions, require liberty to explore and propagate views. A 
singular focus on choice without consideration of checks and balances needed to 
protect democracies from intolerance of ideas is inadequate for preserving and 
enhancing the ideals of democracy. This is also inadequate because reasoned choice 
itself requires scrutiny of the circumstances under which the right to choose is 
exercised.
A focus on giving an ever more list of topics one at a time for voters to make 
binary decisions misses the need for reasoned choice. The idea that the purpose 
of democracy is to enact into legislation the wishes of the electorate as gleaned 
from voting data ignores many important issues raised in the social choice litera-
ture. There is information deficiency in ascertaining preferences by vote counting 
alone without supplementing the data with additional information (Sen 1973). In 
a telling phrase, one of the most distinguished scholars to provide inspirations for 
rational choice political theory makes a distinction between values that individu-
als hold and the ‘tastes’ which might enter a utility function (Arrow 1963, p. 23). 
Taste, as that word is used in utilitarian economics, can be whimsical. For example, 
Becker calls an arbitrary dislike of people because of their gender or skin colour the 
1 Downs (1957) broadened the discussion to postulate that politicians and political parties choose poli-
cies to maximize their chance of winning elections.
2 Many voting paradoxes have been studied in the literature (Forder 2011: 44; Fishburn 1974; Woodall 
1987; Nurmi 1998). See Appendix A for a discussion.
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manifestation of a taste for discrimination against those people (Becker 1973). Val-
ues require greater thought. I value privacy is a statement of a reasoned preference 
than the declaration that I have a taste for privacy. Democracy is not legitimized 
simply by participation in franchise for the recording of voters’ tastes. For the exer-
cise of voting to confer democratic legitimacy on governance, it needs to be exam-
ined if the circumstances surrounding that act fostered freedom of discussion and 
debate to arrive at a reasoned view. The distinction between tastes and values is not 
easy to make in a formal model of voting, but that does not absolve us from looking 
at “the entire system of values, including values about values, in seeking for a truly 
general theory of social welfare” (Arrow 1963, p. 18). This point is further elabo-
rated upon in the literature on rationality and freedom (Sen 2002, p. 6).
Complex issues require detailed examination, and some of these issues are best 
dealt with through deliberations of elected representatives. Our contention is that 
resort to referendums can exacerbate the problems for democracy by over-simplifi-
cation of issues. This tension manifests itself starkly in discourses on criminal jus-
tice, patriotism, national identity, and human rights.
3  Emergence of a New Political Doctrine
We begin our discussion not with an analysis of Athenian democracy in antiquity, 
but with a description of a more recent occurrence, the transition from agriculture 
to industry.3 The sovereignty of the state is “contingent upon our agreement to [the] 
exercise” of power by the state over its citizens (Laski 1962, p. 23). Consent of the 
public in the feudal system characterising agrarian societies derived from the legiti-
macy to rule enjoyed by the monarch. Authority in feudal societies derived from a 
stable system of hierarchies, based on faith and fear, as the twentieth century econo-
mist Keynes was to explain. Power was vested in the monarch by deities that all 
revered and feared. There was a symbiotic relationship between the clergy and the 
Crown to reinforce faith and inculcate fear.4 There were promised rewards in after-
life for unquestioning acceptance of misery while alive.
That bargain began to be perceived as less attractive, as religion began to lose its 
grip with the social upheavals of industrialization, than the quest by the masses for a 
better existence in this life. This quest eventually led to the emergence of an element 
of electoral input in the design of institutions of governance. The rulers needed to 
claim new forms of legitimacy in the exercise of power when piety alone would not 
suffice. Movements for democracy to succeed, the hold of religion had to weaken to 
disentangle the spiritual from the temporal.
3 This section is taken from an earlier article of mine published in this journal (Chakravarty 2008).
4 When that symbiotic relationship between the clergy and the crown broke down, as it did in sixteenth 
century Britain between the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the King, battles ensued to establish a new 
religious order to confer God’s approval of the monarch’s exercise of power. Eventually, a new church 
with Henry as the Supreme Head would be established. It would be independent of Rome. Catholics 
would be regarded as a potential threat to the crown and needed to be excluded from power. Test Acts 
imposed disabilities on those that would not pass the test of “true belief”.
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Industrial trends imposed changes in the hierarchy of authority by enriching some 
that did not inherit wealth, often initially bestowed by the monarch at some point in 
the past, and were not members of the established religion. As the grip of religion 
lessened, as we shall presently see, government was less fearful of religious dissent. 
For example, Catholics were allowed from 1829 to become members of parliament 
in Britain. Exercise of power was increasingly legitimised by money, even if that 
was new money.
Consider the sequence of events in England. By the mid-nineteenth century, rapid 
population movements occasioned by economic change following the industrial rev-
olution reduced the hold of the clergy on the new working class. The clergy were 
often not there to inculcate belief in the moral superiority of the crown, and the dis-
tribution of wealth in the realm. A new concept of morality was called for.
“By modern standards the working classes and urban masses which grew up 
in the period of the Industrial Revolution were no doubt strongly influenced 
by religion; by the standards of the first half of the 19th century there was no 
precedent for their remoteness from, ignorance of, and indifference to, organ-
ised religion….[as the] British Religious Census of 1851 demonstrated it to 
the horror of contemporaries. Much of this remoteness was due to the utter 
failure of the traditional established churches to cope with agglomerations...
the great cities and the new industrial settlements...and with social classes...
the proletariat...which were foreign to their routines and experience. By 1851, 
there were church places available for only 34 per cent of the inhabitants of 
Sheffield, only 31.2 per cent for those in Liverpool and Manchester, only 29 
per cent of those in Birmingham. The problems of being a parish priest in an 
agricultural village were no guide to the cure of souls in an industrial town or 
urban slum.” (Hobsbawm 1962, p. 263).
Economic organisation has a bearing on the way political and civic institutions 
develop (Hirschman 1994; Lacroix 2017). The adaptive behaviour in a static feu-
dal society of accepting one’s externally determined position on the social ladder 
becomes disturbed by rapid economic change. “Improvements in conditions and 
observed social mobility can release people from adaptive preferences. Even if peo-
ple still believe that the poor will always be with us, they may begin to ask why they 
[themselves] should be among them” (Elster 1989, p. 163). Electoral democracy as 
a process of conferring legitimacy of the exercise of power by those in authority is a 
product of changes in the economic system, transition from feudalism to capitalism, 
occasioned by the industrial revolution.
Feudal certainties having come into question in the wake of industrialisation, a 
secular justification of property rights was needed. The new rich, by making money 
through commerce and industry and not necessarily always by birth, developed a 
countervailing power against the landed gentry and their counterpart the rural 
clergy. The new capitalist rich could not be ignored.
The new ideology to legitimise the distribution of privileges under capitalism 
accompanying industrialisation was to promote the interest of the individual as the 
focus of analysis. A community was best organised if individuals could pursue their 
self-interest. “The purpose of promoting the individual was to depose the monarch 
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and the church…” (Keynes1963, p. 273). Let us start with an early utilitarian, Jer-
emy Bentham. He put the utilitarian case bluntly:
“The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who 
are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the com-
munity then is, what? – the sum of the interests of the several members who 
compose it.” (quoted in Arblaster 1987, p. 65).
This Benthamite idea is encapsulated in Mishan’s essay on Pareto efficiency in 
utilitarian political economy:
“…the welfare of each person in society is to count, and nothing more is to 
count. The phrase ‘nothing more is to count’ is appended to the sentence in 
order to obviate any ‘transcendental’ or ‘holistic’ interpretation of society’s 
welfare. In no other words, no abstractions such as the ‘general good’ and no 
such entity as the ‘state’ is to be considered in addition to the welfare of the 
individuals comprising society.” (Mishan 1982, p. 33)
Viewed from the perspective of a Benthamite society, democracy becomes an 
exercise of aggregation of individual preferences expressed through the ballot box 
to articulate a view of the social choice. Insofar as different versions of capitalism 
emerged, so did emerge different institutional forms of democracy. But there were 
certain commonalities. Elections in some form extending rights to an increasing 
fraction of the population became an essential common ingredient. However, this 
Benthamite conception of society falls far short of what is needed to provide moral 
justification for democracy.
As it began to evolve, elections were viewed not just as a procedure for elect-
ing governments but, perhaps more importantly, as a means of impressing humility 
upon elected leaders. What elections could aim to do at the minimum was to hold 
out the threat that the rulers’ tenure could be curtailed by the voters. In combination, 
but only in combination, with strong institutions endowed with power to challenge 
the elected leaders against the exercise of arbitrary power, elections could also hold 
back the emergence of an elected dictatorship.
4  Will of the Majority
The emergence of the utilitarian movement provided an early framework for a lib-
eral society, but only as a negative idea of what it was not to be. It was not to be a 
dictatorship. There was no prescription to define and reconcile moral rights of the 
individual with the claims of society. Jeremy Bentham “thought that the idea of 
moral rights was ‘nonsense on stilts’” (Dworkin 1970, p. 1). Utilitarians value indi-
vidual rights only insofar as they contribute to the greater good of society. There is 
a right to equal treatment in that all votes, if social decisions are based on aggrega-
tion of votes cast by individuals, are to be treated equally. The literature on democ-
racy which has developed from this tradition has placed focus on searching for the 
majority view, often justified by reference to the Condorcet Jury Theorem which has 
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been discussed extensively in the literature (Ladha 1992). Much has been written 
about the mathematical and statistical properties of different ways of counting votes, 
and different concepts of the majority view. All voting systems are found to contain 
anomalies. “The chief relevant point here is that virtually every particular scheme 
proposed for election from single-member constituencies has been shown to have 
certain arbitrary features” (Arrow 1963, p. 6). It is time to move on the discussion 
beyond vote counting rules to elucidate the majority view. There are other aspects 
of improving the functioning of democracy which need attention. In any event, 
the majority per se does not have claim to legitimacy to govern because it fails the 
moral claim of democracy as a system of government for all. Majority rule which 
discards the rights of those that have not voted for the government is simply a form 
of dictatorship.
If elected leaders, even when they command majority support, explicitly exclude 
the concern of those that had not voted for them, they forfeit any claim to moral 
legitimacy of democratic rule. It is on that basis that the Westminster Parliament 
in London voted in 1969 to dismiss the elected government in Northern Ireland 
(Ulster). That province was carved out of Ireland when the Catholic dominated 
south of that island gained independence from British rule after the first world war. 
Slogans of a “Protestant government for a Protestant people” (Bardon 2005, pp. 
538–539), was attributed to the first Prime Minister, Lord Craigavon, of Northern 
Ireland. This majoritarian approach to governance, with some modification, came to 
characterise the elected governments of Ulster. It was a blot on the post war aspira-
tion for a liberal democracy in Britain. The United Kingdom was a signatory of the 
Treaty of London aspiring to uphold human rights under the auspices of the newly 
created Council of Europe. The distasteful antics of the government in Northern Ire-
land became an embarrassment. The Westminster parliament in London, seat of the 
UK government, sent troops to the province in 1969, suspending the Stormont par-
liament there, and imposing direct rule from London.
Whilst no British government has been returned with majority support, certainly 
not in post war Britain, the Stormont parliament, until it was abolished by decree 
from Westminster, continued to enjoy majority support amongst the electorate in 
Northern Ireland. When “British troops were first deployed, in August 1969, it was 
mainly for the protection of the [minority] Catholics – both in Belfast and Derry 
– against the sectarian police force of the Stormont regime…” (O’Brien 1971, p. 
17).
Schumpeter stated the most obvious of the problems for majoritarian governance: 
“evidently, the will of the majority is the will of the majority and not the will of 
the people” (Schumpeter 1950, p. 272). Viewed this way, no democratic norm was 
violated when the UK government in 1969 sent troop to Ulster (Northern Ireland) 
imposing direct rule from London by dissolving the local legislature and govern-
ment elected by the majority in that province.
Stormont parliament bestowed privileges and constrained rights of people for 
who they were rather than what they were. This type of parliamentary system could 
not command moral supremacy over authoritarian rule. Respect for the universal 
nature of human rights has been enshrined in various international proclamations 
since the middle of the twentieth century. These values, which occasionally clash 
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with public opinion, have come to be associated with the idea of democracy. Majori-
tarian rule fails to satisfy the lofty ideals of democracy.
5  Rule of Law
A right to vote does not in itself lead to a right to liberty (Berlin 1958, p. 51). Will of 
the people and the rule of law guaranteeing liberty of thought and expression might 
diverge from time to time. Some commentators suggest  a stronger role for non-
elected institutions, especially the judiciary, at times of social upheavals, to protect 
democracies against the danger of being metamorphosed into elected dictatorships 
(Booth 2005). There is a view that it is in the interest of the community to guard the 
rights of individuals in certain spheres of interaction with the state, for example the 
right of an accused to due process of the law. These rights might be legislated by 
an elected parliament, but they need to be defended by an independent judiciary to 
be protected against the ephemeral currents of public opinion. Some legal philoso-
phers go further (Dworkin 1977). They argue that individuals have moral rights, due 
process being only one such right, which need not seek validity through legislative 
sanction and judicial protection. They must be taken as granted in a democracy.
In striking down a law passed by the legislature in West Virginia making it com-
pulsory for school pupils to salute the American flag, US Supreme Court Justice 
Robert H Jackson took a similar view of rights. He explained:
“The idea of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicis-
situdes of political controversy, to put them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts” 
(Jackson 1943 quoted in Holmes 1989b, p. 196).
To allow unrestricted domain of choice is to invite cognitive dissonance leading 
to arbitrary decisions. There is a threat to liberty. There must be some sphere of 
rights where the individual reigns supreme. The removal of choice to interfere by all 
others in this sphere of the individual is not only compatible with but also essential 
for democracy. Justice Jackson in the above judgement places the right not to submit 
to constant tests of patriotism amongst these essential rights.
Without rights to challenge conventions, whether by words or through the arts, 
before ballots are cast in the electoral process, reflections on values underpinning 
choice is not possible. Some of these rights are guarded by non-elected institutions 
and some are strengthened through other rights like the right peacefully to protest 
making it possible to appeal to public conscience when rights are violated. How 
rights are best guarded needs attention, and discourse on democracy must take that 
challenge on board.
If we are to address the danger of the emergence of elected dictatorships, we 
need to take on board the necessity of establishing boundaries of choice offered to 
individuals so as not to intrude on some protected sphere of individual rights. If 
the majority is given a vote whether to lynch some minority due to their religion, 
race, appearance, food habit, or whatever, a ghastly outcome could not be ruled out. 
Results reported in the Milgram experiments in psychology raise concern about the 
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propensity of otherwise decent people to inflict extreme cruelty on fellow human 
beings if instructed to do so by a figure of authority (Milgram 1963). Democracies 
whether inspired by utilitarian ideas or moral principles of rights grapple with these 
fears by identifying input filters into the choice set, rejecting “certain classes of 
desires and preferences”, and specifying output filters by rejecting certain outcomes 
of choice (Goodin 1989, p. 78). These filters are guarded by institutions, for example 
an independent and sometime supra-national judiciary not subject to the whimsical 
fluctuations in public opinion. Some of these filters are backed up by legislation, 
and some are bolstered by social norms discouraging, for example, interference in 
the operational decisions of law enforcement agencies for the personal or political 
gains of rulers. Thus, especially in western democracies, social norm require that 
government is enjoined from using investigative agencies, for example tax authori-
ties and crime investigative bureaus, to shield criminals amongst supporters or to 
silence the opposition. We judge a democracy not just by its adherence to the prin-
ciple of unmanipulated elections, but also by the degree of credible protection to 
rights afforded to dissenters to express their ideas. Existence of a free and vibrant 
press, and the willingness of the country to submit to an independent judiciary at 
home and to supra-national jurisdiction over internationally recognized rights of the 
individual are the marks of a democracy.
After the second world war, there was a recognition of the need also to restrict 
national sovereignty by setting up supra-national legal bodies, for example the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, to ensure liberty. Even a constitutionally independent 
judicial system within a country, it is now recognized, may require supra-national 
cover to resist domestic political pressure to suppress rights.
We may have to go further. Even when rights are not violated, preferences of 
individuals could “sometimes seem ‘dirty’” (Goodin 1989, p. 76) and in need of 
laundering before being presented for a vote. If a masochist individual wishes to 
suffer torture, should there be laws against assisting in the torture of a masochist? 
Articulating and guarding these boundaries need to be under constant discussion to 
build and keep consensus on rights. These discussions also inform the values which 
enter the choice function at the ballot box.
6  Censoring of Choice
Apart from the question of rights, there is another reason for censoring, or at least 
sequencing, choice offered to the electorate. “To avoid destructive conflicts, we sup-
press controversial themes” (Holmes 1989a, p. 19). Confidence building measures 
in diplomacy start with topics on which easy agreements can be reached. Interna-
tional and national declarations on human rights provide one approach. International 
declarations bypass questions of national sovereignty in formulating aspirations for 
identifying universal moral values. National declarations sometimes enshrined in 
constitutions come to define national aspirations. Aspirations once stated get detailed 
meaning through case law over time. The declaration by the founding fathers at US 
independence, many of them slave holders, that “all men are created equal” began to 
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be given meaning against racial discrimination only through case law in the second 
half of the twentieth century.
Themes that arouse primordial feelings of religious or national identity are not 
easily amenable to rational discourse, and they need to be parsed to become amena-
ble to rational discourse. Discourse based on a scalar view of identity defining peo-
ple obfuscates matters where evidence becomes less important than doctrine (Sen 
2006). We have multiple identities as members of various groups (Sen 2006).5 Pars-
ing the choice set is essential for rational discourse.
John F Kennedy in his presidential campaign resolved the problem of deep sus-
picion of Roman Catholics by the numerically more important protestant voters by 
announcing his unconditional allegiance to the state over the dictates of his faith. 
Then the discussion could proceed to issues about economic wellbeing, foreign pol-
icy and the like.
A visceral fear of Catholics characterized American politics for more than a 
100 years. “In 1875, a decade after accepting General Lee’s surrender at Appomat-
tox, President Ulysses S. Grant publicly warned that Catholicism might prove as 
divisive in American society as the Confederacy” (McGreevy and Appleby 2010). 
Fearful of his political agenda being hijacked by this single issue, Kennedy made 
the doctrine of the separation of church and state a central message in his quest for 
the White House. Early in the presidential campaign season, he appeared before a 
gathering of Protestant ministers to declare that he took seriously the separation of 
his faith from his political agenda. In making decisions on governance, he would 
ignore the dictates of the church.6 This agenda restriction, for example removing 
the discussion about the religious affiliation of Kennedy in our example, is a com-
mon feature of decision making. “He who determines what politics is about runs the 
country” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, p. 948).
7  Choice Over Policy or Choice Over Outcome?
An exclusive focus on vote counting misses an important point: what is being 
counted? Voting data do not tell us why the choice that is marked on the ballot 
paper is made. What was the reasoning behind that choice? Even a clear win for a 
candidate is no mandate for policies espoused by the victor because the reasoning 
is unknown. Wise governments examine the reason why they won, and reflect on 
6 A copy of the lecture can be found at http://www.npr.org/templ ates/story /story .php?story Id=16920 600 
(downloaded 07 August 2017).
5 “In our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups – we belong to all of them. 
The same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizen, of Caribbean origin, with Afri-
can ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a long-distance runner, a historian, a school-
teacher, a novelist, a feminist, a heterosexual, a believer in gay and lesbian rights, a theatre lover, an 
environmental activist, a tennis fan, a jazz musician, and someone who is deeply committed to the view 
that there are intelligent beings in outer space with whom it is extremely urgent to talk (preferably in 
English). Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person belongs, gives her a particular identity.” 
(Sen 2006, prologue, Kindle edition).
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the potential disconnect between the outcome expected and policies they chose at 
the ballot box. This becomes a more difficult exercise in referendum led democ-
racies because referendums present multiple components of an issue as a scalar 
choice.
Choice can be clouded by issues not on the ballot. For example, an electorate 
disillusioned with the performance of government on one set of issues might vote 
against government proposal in a referendum concerning an altogether different 
issue. An analysis of election statistics published by the House of Commons sug-
gests that there is a protest vote against the party in power at byelections when a 
seat is vacated due to resignation or death (see Table 12 Audickas et al. 2017). A 
third party which is unlikely to form a government, in Britain it often used to be the 
Liberal Democrats in the past, can benefit. Observed choice may be conflated with 
preference if the underlying reason for choice is not investigated (Sen 1973). If that 
missing information is absent in the formulation of government policy, the outcome 
may not command public support.
Consider an example. Suppose that voters wish to see a reduction in the crime 
rate and vote for a policy which they think will diminish crime. Suppose further that 
the outcome of the policy is quite the reverse. They might still blame the govern-
ment, even if it enacts into policy the voters’ choice, for their disappointment. Indi-
viduals cannot be held responsible to gather specialist knowledge, but government 
can be held responsible for lack of expertise. “Consenting to a process is not the 
same thing as consenting to the outcomes of the process” (Coleman 1989, p. 197).
For the purposes of illustrating the idea further, consider the following numerical 
exercise taken from Haslett (1985). He constructed the exercise illustrating a differ-
ent issue, but the example is apposite here.
Suppose that society comprises three individuals—Hilda, Matilda and Zelda. 
They have to decide at an election on the criterion for the choice of policy. There are 
two criteria: applying the Rawlsian Difference Principle or applying the Utilitarian 
Principle in deciding on policy. The Difference Principle entails that a policy which 
makes the worst off better off should be chosen (Rawls 1972, pp. 75–80) and the 
Utilitarian Principle entails that policy should aim to maximise the aggregate utility 
of all concerned. The numerical values of the two alternatives are as follows. Policy 
Alternative 1 provides Hilda, Matilda and Zelda with 300, 200, 500 utils, respec-
tively. Policy Alternative 2 provides Hilda, Matilda and Zelda with 5000, 3000, and 
50 utils, respectively. Utilitarian considerations entail the choice of Alternative 2. It 
produces an aggregate social utility of 8050 compared to only 1000 under Alterna-
tive 1. However, the person who is worst off under Alternative 1 obtains 200 utils. 
This is better than 50 utils available under Alternative 2. The Difference Principle 
suggests Alternative 1.
Now consider a case of sequential applications of policy between elections. Sup-
pose that at some initial date, the date of the election, voters choose the Difference 
Principle (DP) over the Utilitarian Principle (UP). They apply their chosen rule in 
three sequential policy choices as outlined in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below.
Let us look at the consequence of choosing policy DP at each point in the 
sequence, in conformity with the ex ante preference for that policy. Table 4 gives 
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Table 1  Utility distribution 
under choice set 1
Person Policies on offer Policy choice
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 DP UP
Alt 1 Alt 2
Hilda 25 120 25 120
Matilda 20 60 20 60
Zelda 15 10 15 10
Total 60 190 60 190
Table 2  Utility distribution 
under choice set 2
Person Policies on offer Policy choice
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 DP UP
Alt 1 Alt 2
Hilda 70 10 70 10
Matilda 25 65 25 65
Zelda 25 55 25 55
Total 120 130 120 130
Table 3  Utility distribution 
under choice set 3
Person Policies on offer Policy choice
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 DP UP
Alt 1 Alt 2
Hilda 45 50 45 50
Matilda 25 5 25 5
Zelda 15 45 15 45
Total 85 100 95 100
Table 4  Final outcome dictated 
by the DP criterion
Names First set Second set Third set Total outcome
Hilda 25 70 45 140
Matilda 20 25 25 70
Zelda 15 25 15 55
Total 60 120 85 265
Table 5  Final outcome dictated 
by the UP criterion
Names First set Second set Third set Total outcome
Hilda 120 10 50 180
Matilda 60 65 5 130
Zelda 10 55 45 110
Total 190 130 100 420
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the outcome. Then compare that outcome with what might have been, as shown in 
Table 5, if choices at each step were dictated by the utility maximisation criterion. 
Comparing the final outcomes in Tables 4 and 5, we note that the application of 
the difference principle, choosing policies which maximise the utility of the worst 
off, leads to the worst off person getting only 55 utils. If the choices were instead 
based on the utility maximisation criterion, the worst off person would have obtained 
110 utils. Policy choices based on ex ante preference for policy, in this case, leads to 
an ex post outcome which is contrary to the voters’ wishes.
8  Referendums
The above type of mismatch between policy choice and expected outcome can be 
particularly stark in a referendum, especially when there is a binary choice on a 
complex issue. Schumpeter mentions crime as one of those complex issues on which 
seeking inflexible prescriptions from the public in referendums are inappropriate.
“Take for example the case of so bulky and so technical a measure as a crimi-
nal code. The democratic method will apply to the question whether or not a 
country is to have such a codification at all. It will also apply to certain ‘issues’ 
that the government may choose to select for political decision which is more 
than formal – for instance, whether certain practices of labor or employers’ 
associations should or should not be considered criminal. But for the rest, gov-
ernment and parliament will have to accept the specialists’ advice whatever 
they may think themselves.” (Schumpeter 1950, p. 292).
An example is to be found in a story reported in the New York Times on the 5th of 
March 1995 about the freak outcome of a referendum held in California on sentenc-
ing guidelines for convicted criminals. The proposal was to mandate a prison term 
for at least 25 years before parole could be considered after the third conviction of 
a repeat offender. The voters were presented with a binary decision: yes or no to 
the proposal. The referendum question did not distinguish between violent and non-
violent crimes. The campaign took place in the background of press reports about 
a murder committed by a culprit who had previous convictions for violent crimes. 
Emotions were running high. Professionals having experience in the maintenance 
of law and order were skeptical about the wisdom of imposing such an inflexible 
mandate on the judiciary. Soon after the referendum proposal was carried, a young 
pizza thief, who had helped himself to a slice of pizza, was caught in the net. He had 
previous convictions.
Hardin (2009, pp. 68–69) provides many examples of perverse outcomes of ref-
erendums. Here we shall look at the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom held 
in June 2016. It took place in the background of press reports about many of the fail-
ures of the European Union, and there are many. The Maastricht Treaty was drawn 
up by a political class which failed to listen to even its own advisors about the need 
for non-market institutions to cater for regional imbalances (Chakravarty 2016a). 
This failure was compounded by the introduction of a single currency conceived as 
a monetarist experiment then in vogue in the corridors of power, and introduced at a 
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time when financial regulations did not keep up with emerging techniques of specu-
lation which transmitted and amplified financial bubbles across national frontiers. 
The inevitable outcome, the international credit crunch, exacerbated EU-specific 
crises like the one in Greece. The EU was deservedly shown up in an unfavour-
able light in the press coverage of problems in the eurozone. “Unfortunately, while 
finance has gone global, its regulations remains a national affair. … as financial cri-
ses grow in frequency and severity, they will inflict social and political instability 
and ultimately breed a backlash against globalization” (Roubini and Mihm 2010, p. 
300).
If public confidence in western democracy is not to be eroded, major reform is 
needed, and not just of the EU institutions. Countries like the UK, a member state 
which remains outside the euro, and the US also need to wake up to voter alienation 
by addressing the distributional consequences of globalisation and technical change 
(Sennett 1998). The fiscal pressure of the rising cost of bank rescue and reliance on 
austerity measures bring into sharp focus the failure of globalized finance as it has 
evolved since the 1980s. What is needed is to address the regulatory issues in con-
cert with trading partners instead of relying exclusively on austerity measures put-
ting public services under increasing strain. Government complacency about cross-
border cooperation needed to regulate the international financial system, and stories 
of the EU leaders’ failure to engage in reforming the financial system, that the Brexit 
referendum was held. The referendum was an opportunity for the public to vent dis-
illusionment with the orthodoxy of globalization.
It is in the very nature of a referendum that complex issues are not clarified, as 
noted by Schumpeter above. The binary choice placed before the electorate in the 
referendum on EU membership was not amenable to rational discourse over eco-
nomic impacts because the only sure comment that could be made was that Brexit 
would create huge uncertainty. The terms of exit were not on the ballot paper. They 
were not known except in terms of vague and meaningless slogans about taking 
back control. It was not even discussed who was to take back control, parliament 
or the executive? Voters were asked to choose in darkness about the terms of exit, 
the terms which could have an enormous impact on their lives.7 Thus the discourse 
focused on nostalgia about an imagined past. Doctrines of identity, which are not 
amenable to rational discourse because they are moved by feelings and not hard evi-
dence, arouse extreme passions. The ‘evidence’ comprises selective memories of a 
collective past. The Czech born German speaking American political scientist Karl 
Deutsch once described discussion of national identity focusing on excluding the 
7 For example, voters were not told because the government did not know if the UK would come out of 
Euratom, the agency for cooperation and regulation of safety in nuclear materials. Newspaper reports 
now suggests that a leading figures in the Leave campaign, Dominic Cummings, now describes “Theresa 
May’s government as ‘morons’ over plans to drag Britain out of Euratom” (Payne 2017). The voters did 
not know the implication of a vote on the peace process in Northern Ireland. Government has made a 
commitment, entered into in the peace process to end sectarian killings which had blighted the history 
of Ulster for much of the twentieth century, to a border between Ulster and the Republic of Ireland being 
free of check posts. How could an open border be maintained if movements of goods between the EU 
and the UK become subject to customs control? No one could tell.
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other as a discourse conducted by “…a group of persons united by a common error 
about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours” (Deutsch 1969).
Many voters may have discounted economic problems of exit—reliable calcu-
lations of economic gains and losses, let alone the distribution of pain and gain, 
could not be undertaken with any degree of certainty because the terms of exit were 
unknown at the time of the referendum—and it is only now dawning on them the 
potential risk to economic stability depending on the terms of exit which were not 
on the ballot papers.
This is a special case of conflict between ex ante choice and ex post evaluation of 
that decision. Democracy cannot surely forbid such re-evaluation simply because a 
vote was cast in the dark? In a representative form of government, policies compris-
ing the winning platform are evaluated for coherence before implementation.8 Yet 
referendum-based politics make it difficult to change course because the period of 
remit of a referendum result is ill-specified. The post-referendum slogan by both the 
major parties in the UK is that the decision of the electorate to leave the EU, taken 
in darkness about the terms of exit, must be carried out even on terms which could 
not have been imagined at the time of the vote as a mark of respect for democracy. 
This is like arguing that a government once elected must be allowed to govern, even 
if its policy platform turns out to be a fantasy, without having to submit ever again 
to elections. Referendums do not clarify the choice set in elections, and they do not 
enhance the aspiration of democracy that people must have a say in how they are 
governed.
This is in contrast with the idea of periodic general elections to elect representa-
tives to govern. There is a clear path for abandoning support for a policy on which 
the winning representatives are committed when it turns out to be unworkable in 
the course of a parliament. The electorate can choose to dismiss a government if the 
outcome of policies for which voters had cast their ballot turn out to be worse than 
anticipated.
The underlying logic of periodic tests of opinion is that it is rational to change 
views if antecedent ordering of priorities was not based on all relevant information 
needed to make the calculations of policy consequence. It is not even unprecedented 
in a democracy for a government upon election to re-order priorities hinted at the 
hustings because of a realisation of unanticipated consequences of policy.9 Cit-
ing the writings of such politically diverse authors as Lipset (1960) and Habermas 
(1975), Przeworski (1991, p. 14) points out that “ex post evaluations modify the ex 
ante commitments”. Asking the voters to acquire specialist knowledge is an abdi-
cation of the responsibility of government to demonstrate competence in seeking 
advice from specialists to deliver the outcome that the electorate desires.10
8 See the discussion in Appendix B about the rise of fiscal deficit in the UK under Mrs. Thatcher who 
came to power having campaigned for a reduction. However, reduction was not compatible with some of 
the other policies also put forward at election time.
9 I have argued this point elsewhere discussing the referendum on UK membership in the EU, and the 
argument is repeated in Appendix B.
10 In our view, it is not the job of the voter to familiarize herself with specialist subjects any more than 
it is the job of the patient to acquire specialist medical knowledge before choosing a doctor. The patient 
reserves the right to question the doctor’s competence if the treatment turns out to be wrong.
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Referendums do not provide the electorate with an effective voice because, 
by taking issues in isolation referendums do not contribute to reasoned choice. 
Referendums deny voice by blocking new information from being considered. 
If participatory democracy means more referendums to increase public engage-
ment with democracy, it is tracking the wrong solution by conflating democracy 
as a utility maximization exercise under an ill-defined information set.
9  Conclusions
The challenges to democracy from populist movements offering simplistic solu-
tions to voters disillusioned with democracies which suffered a jolt to self-
confidence following the credit crunch in 2007 cannot be addressed purely by 
focusing on the voting system, either by examining the rules for aggregating 
individual choice expressed through the ballot box or by burdening the elector-
ate with more elections as in referendums on complex policies. In our view, the 
dangers to democracy are better addressed by focusing attention on the design of 
institutions which can thwart the rise of an elected dictatorship, and by strength-
ening representative governance by creating room for reflection on the current 
economic model which has failed to address the anxieties (Sennett 1998) of the 
electorate about technical change and globalisation. The outcome of the Brexit 
referendum is a warning. Once that genie of nationalism begins to get released 
in one country after another, international cooperation will become difficult to 
make globalisation an attractive electoral proposition.
The role of non-elected institutions in protecting democracy cannot be 
emphasized too much (Booth 2005). The impact on democracy of the rise of 
autocratic leaders in Russia, Turkey and the United States have been different 
from each other because there are institutional differences. American democ-
racy is strengthened by checks on presidential powers which have evolved since 
the Nixon era to shield the operational decisions of non-elected bodies such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation from presidential diktat. It takes time to 
appoint new judges to do the president’s bidding. Even the judges that a presi-
dent appoints cannot be guaranteed fully to cooperate in egregious attempts to 
unleash investigative agencies to harass opposition politicians. Norms of politi-
cal discourse constrain wholesale muzzling of the press. These norms matter. 
Elections alone cannot provide good governance, let alone good democratic gov-
ernance. Witness Turkey and Russia.
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Appendix A: How to Count the Election Outcome?
Vote counting rules can have a critical impact of what is declared as the voters’ choice. 
Donald Trump won against his main rival Hilary Clinton having secured fewer votes 
than her. A similar anomaly was observed in 2000 when George W. Bush defeated Al 
Gore. The outcomes of these elections have generated interest in the voting aggregation 
rules used in the US presidential election. For example, calculations using US voting 
data by Maskin and Sen (2017) in the 2016 presidential election suggest that removal 
of certain anomalies, for example third party votes are now wasted, in the sequence of 
selecting the presidential candidate would have denied Donald Trump the key to the 
White House. However, it is accepted that no vote counting rule is free of the anom-
aly that a candidate who is less liked could defeat a candidate who carry greater sup-
port. Now consider the recent German elections. If the first past the post system of 
electing members of parliament in London were adopted as the counting rule for the 
Bundestag in Germany, Angela Merkel’s CDU–CSU combination would have com-
fortably retained power. Parliament in Britain comprises members elected by single 
member constituencies under the plurality rule of vote counting. The CDU–CSU com-
bination won 231 out of 299 Constituency seats in 2017, not far behind the 236 out of 
299 in the 2013 election. Merkel would have been declared the overwhelming winner 
in 2017. The first past the post system of selecting members of parliament has come 
under special scrutiny in the UK in recent years because of the lack of correspondence 
between the share of seats in parliament for a party and the share of the votes cast for 
it. Devolved assemblies in Ulster, Scotland and Wales use other methods to address the 
problem. They carry their own anomalies (Woodall 1986, 1987). In Wales and Scot-
land, vote counting rules are closer to the AV system used in selecting members of the 
Bundestag. The single transferable vote (STV) is used in Ulster. Cases could arise in 
the Welsh Assembly elections where increase in the support for a party would paradox-
ically become problematic for the party (Altunbas et al. 2002). Bogdanor (1984, p. 41) 
provides more examples of anomalies in the AV and STV system used elsewhere, for 
example, in Australia and the Republic of Ireland. In 1977, the combined share of votes 
(first and second preference votes) for the Australian Liberal Party was a meagre 38.3% 
of the votes cast. They commanded 53.2% of the seats, and ousted Labor from power 
although Australian Labor had obtained a larger per cent of the votes. In the Republic 
of Ireland, where the single transferable vote formula is applied, in both 1965 and 1969 
Fianna Fail party formed the government having managed to secure only a plurality of 
the first preference votes. There are also conceptual difficulties in relating proportion-
ality of votes with the idea of proportionality of power. A paper by Saari and Sieberg 
(2001) presents an interesting analysis of the statistical aspects of bundling a number of 
issues, for example in a referendum, presented as a single dimensional choice.
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Appendix B: Unintended Outcomes
I have argued this point elsewhere discussing the referendum on UK membership 
of the EU casting doubts about the democratic merit of holding a referendum on 
EU membership in Britain (Chakravarty 2016b). The argument, some of it is ver-
batim, is repeated here. A difference between participating in parliamentary elec-
tions in a system of representative government and voting in referendums is that the 
voter imposes on herself and the rest of society a greater burden of any unintended 
and unwelcome consequences of the outcome of a referendum. These consequences 
may not become apparent until after the results are known but the winning policy 
cannot be reversed without holding another referendum. This is especially so when 
the status quo is severely jolted in pursuit of identity politics, which sit uneasily 
with economic reality. In electing representatives to govern, the voter has the lux-
ury of voting for government on a policy platform, but judging the government on 
consequences of that platform. Casting a vote for candidates espousing, for exam-
ple, a tough stance on immigration does not constrain the voter from criticizing a 
government thus elected if the availability of medical care is compromised due to 
lack of qualified staff. In representative democracy, government has some leeway 
for manoeuvre if the consequences of living with policies espoused at the hustings 
prove intolerable. Referendums do not allow that leeway. Mrs. Thatcher secured a 
parliamentary majority in 1979 on a policy platform comprising, inter alia, a vow 
dramatically to reduce the share of government expenditure in the GDP which then 
stood at 45%. Notwithstanding this harsh rhetoric, government expenditure and its 
share in the GDP continued to increase in the initial years driven by unforeseen fis-
cal pressures of a sudden and sharp rise in unemployment. The ratio finally came 
down, but only to 40% of the GDP, when she left office a decade later. This is not to 
say that representative governance entails a cavalier disregard of promises made at 
election time but to suggest that the promises need to be interpreted in context. The 
context is the need for elected representatives, once in government, to engage with 
complex technical issues and tedious details of policy to ensure coherence to avoid 
chaos. That is why stable democracies choose representative forms of government, 
and governance by referendum is shunned.
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